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If the third sector has typically enjoyed a low, uncontroversial public profile on the UK’s 
political agenda, then a general election is a time of potential deviation.  It can provide an 
opportunity for the sector to see its interests represented in public debate and to engage with 
parties from across the political spectrum, seeking to establish productive future relationships.  
However, the sector is not a single entity, indeed as this paper explores, the language of ‘third 
sector’ is contested.  The term is used here, together with the shorthand ‘the sector’, for 
consistency to describe the diversity of voluntary and community organisations and social 
enterprises that fall outside of the realms of either State or private sector: a heterogeneity 
captured in Kendall and Knapp’s conception of a ‘loose and baggy monster’ (1996). 
 
During the New Labour governments of 1997-2010 the relationship between third sector and 
Government was formalised (Lewis, 2005) through the Compact, first published in 1998 
(Home Office, 1998), and complemented by an underlying framework of financial and 
institutional support.  The Compact represented a fundamental shift in the state/sector 
relationships, “a new approach to partnership … based on shared values and mutual respect” 
(Zimmeck et al., 2012).  This culminated in the establishment of the Office of the Third 
Sector (OTS) in 2006, which merged existing sectoral representation and placed it centre-
stage within the Cabinet Office.  Coupled with the recruitment of key third sector strategic 
partners, and the appointment of sector ‘champions’ across government, third sector policy 
enjoyed a unprecedented degree of political leverage during this period.  Alcock and Kendall 
(2011) have described this as the political ‘constitution’ of the third sector, and while some 
have argued that the process rendered it a ‘governable terrain’ (Carmel & Harlock, 2008), it 
was underpinned by a narrative which posited the sector as a coherent entity.  There were 
clearly mutual benefits to this partnership approach, reflected in Alcock’s description of the 
sector working in ‘strategic unity’ to engage with government (2010a).   
 
However, as Harris (2010) uncovers, the relationship between sector and government has 
fluctuated with political and ideological priorities, a dynamic explored by Wolch and 
conceptualised in terms of a ‘shadow state’ (1990).  Historically the Conservative Party has 
embraced the sector’s potential to assume a greater role in public welfare provision, and in 
the context of a general election couched in a growing awareness of the recession’s lasting 
impact, it was unsurprising that this tendency would be resurrected within a deficit-reduction 
strategy.  In this paper we argue that the discourse used by different parties to frame the 
sector, offers fundamental insight into shifting political third sector priorities. 2 
 
 
For the first time in two decades the 2010 election promised an open competition, in the 
context of deepening recession and a loss of public trust in politicians following the expenses 
scandal (Kavanagh & Cowley, 2011).  In its third term and presiding over a major economic 
crisis, the Labour government had been experiencing a significant decline in its support; 
opinion polls projected they were unlikely to secure a fourth term in office. However, the 
polls also suggested that the Conservatives would be unable to win an outright majority. The 
Liberal Democrats had secured increasing numbers of MPs in recent by-elections and 
appeared likely to benefit from voter disenchantment with both Labour and the 
Conservatives. The 2010 election therefore offered a potential change of government, the 
form of which was unclear.  In the event, none of the political parties achieved a sufficient 
majority to form a government alone, leading to that relatively rare phenomenon in British 
political history, a Coalition Government – between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
parties. 
 
Consequently, despite the sector’s strong position by 2010, electoral uncertainty gave it an 
insecure future.  The artificiality of electoral relationships involved third sector organisations 
(TSOs) courting a range of political agendas and negotiating different kinds of electoral 
language.  Organisations that wanted to get their interests heard and represented needed to 
develop relationships with and lobby political parties on a broad basis, a careful balancing act 
if lasting working relationships were to be fostered and third sector organisations were not 
seen as intrinsically tied to one party’s agenda.  Necessarily this required a unique style of 
cautious campaigning and anticipatory self-censorship, in that it was expedient not to declare 
political alliances in uncertain circumstances.   
 
It was also an election whose timing had been forecast by pundits, and for which there was a 
long lead-in and opportunity for lobbying political parties to secure a place on the agenda.  A 
complicating factor was that once the election had been called, the sector anticipated that 
purdah would provide a barrier to engagement with policy makers, so early strategizing was 
an essential component of their political work.  All stakeholders knew that spending cuts were 
imminent, likely to hit the third as well as public sector, and that consequently good 
relationships with the parties were essential to organisational survival.  A key test of the 
strength of sector-party relationships was the profile of third sector interests in party 
manifestos and election campaigning. 
 
This paper evaluates the success of the sector’s campaigning methods in the 2010 general 
election, measured in the above terms once the election was declared.  This mapping is 
complicated by the three main political parties using very different language to talk about the 
sector.  These distinctions reflect ideological differences in how the sector’s role was seen.  It 
is argued that it is essential to unpick these differences – what they are and what they mean - 
to understand how an apparently high degree of electoral consensus on the sector masked 
very different attitudes to its future functions. 
 3 
 
Below, we discuss the contested terminology and underpinning ideological frameworks 
around the third sector. We then describe the research project which looked at third sector 
electoral politics.  This is followed by an overview of the sector’s campaigning methods 
around the 2010 election, and an assessment of their relative success, measured in terms of 
inclusion in party manifestos, asking how much a consensus politics was established on the 
sector, looking at how the election agenda unfolded, and considering press coverage and less 
visible outcomes.  The paper then shifts its focus to examine the rebranding of the sector, 
which has become increasingly evident with the establishment of a Coalition government, 
before presenting some conclusions. 
 
Political terminology and ideology around the sector.   
A key issue for the research has been the disputed terminology of ‘third sector’.  Alcock and 
Kendall (2011) described this as ‘chronically contested’, a result of different agendas and 
different contexts.  Some have regarded it as tied to the political legacy of New Labour’s 
modernisation period (termed ‘hyperactive mainstreaming’ by Kendall (2009)), and thus 
having political meaning and being inseparable from Blair’s ‘third way’ discourse (itself 
rooted in Giddens’s social theory (1998)).  Indeed Blair was using the term ‘third sector’ in 
speeches from at least 1999.  However, academically the term predates the rise of New 
Labour; the International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR) was established in 1992.  
A primary concern of the ISTR has been to implement a globally understood taxonomic 
concept of the sector, an aim supported by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector 
(JHCNPS) project to develop ‘operational definition’ on the sector (Salamon and Anaheier, 
1992), although the latter has arguably (Wagner, 2012) introduced greater ambiguity over the 
longer term.  More recently Taylor has reflected that the term third sector is ‘semantically 
American’ (Taylor, 2010: 5), with a complex universal resonance. 
 
In the UK ‘third sector’ has become a politically-loaded term and, as Evers and Laville 
(2004) argue, the discourses surrounding the third sector are the product of dominant policy 
regimes or government.  Correspondingly, Kendall (2010b) identified three distinctive 
ideological positions on the third sector: consumerist, civic renewal and democratic life 
revival, which he suggested were adopted by political parties with differing emphases to 
inform distinctive policy climates and development.  Certainly since the 2007 Third Sector 
Review, it became clear that a Brownite premiership would afford a central and valued role to 
the third sector.   
 
By 2008, the Conservative Party also made the point that sector would be key in their 
subsequent electoral policy, with the publication of their Green Paper on voluntary action.  
This was underlined by a Big Society paper published shortly before the election 
(Conservative Party 2010b).  Some reflection of the significance of sectoral terminology is 
the haste with which, following the general election and the subsequent formation of a 
Coalition government, the Office of the Third Sector was rebranded the Office for Civil 
Society (at presumably some cost during a time of austerity). 
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In conducting the research then, it has been necessary to unpick the language used by 
different parts of the sector, the three main political parties, the media, and in public 
discourse.  Partly a reflection of the sector’s enormous diversity and diffuseness, this 
discourse has included: ‘charities and charitable sector’,’ voluntary sector’, ‘voluntary and 
community sector’, ‘non-government/non-statutory organisations’, ‘non-profit organisations’, 
‘social enterprise’, ‘social economy’, ‘civil society’ - terms with rather different emphases 
and meanings. 
 
The general election research 
To look at these issues, research was conducted over a six-month period before, during and 
shortly after the 2010 general election, combining documentary analysis of policy papers and 
the manifestos produced by both TSOs and political parties, analysis of media coverage of 
third sector issues, and 15 qualitative interviews with key policy actors (Parry et al., 2010).  
The latter included umbrella and infrastructure organisations, a large charity, specialist media 
commentator, community-focused organisations, and civil servants/political figures.  These 
simultaneous mixed-methods techniques enabled us to capture the dynamism of the unfolding 
electoral campaign and the third sector’s role in that. 
 
Most research informants were selected at the outset of the project, but some were recruited 
later in the election campaign on the basis of their emerging influence.  Key stakeholder 
interviews covered three main areas: the methods and techniques used by TSOs to campaign 
on a day-to-day basis; TSOs’ planning process leading up to and beyond the general election, 
and changes in campaigning techniques; and reactions to new political alignments. These 
interviews took place between April and July 2010, picking up on different temporal 
reference points.  Recap interviews were held with some earlier respondents to re-engage 
with their expectations in relation to the Coalition government’s agenda.  Face-to-face and 
telephone semi-structured interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim, and transcripts 
were imported into QSR NVivo 8 for coding and analysis, along with fieldwork notes.    
Anonymised material presented in italics in this paper represents direct quotations from these 
transcripts. 
 
Pre-election campaigning methods 
Third sector campaigning took place over three phases characterised by quite different 
activities.  These were: the build-up to the general election, a period which commenced with 
the sector’s planning process up to a year beforehand and culminated in the frenetic activity 
of the early months of 2010; election season, the period from when the election was called, 
political campaigning began and purdah was declared, until election day; and the post-
election period, which opened up a new set of political alignments, and with them 
opportunities for third sector campaigning.  It is the first of these, the organised lobbying 
activity, that is most significant for this paper; see Parry et al. (2005) for an analysis of the 
longer timeline of sector campaigning. 
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In the context of a prolonged build-up to the 2010 general election, stakeholders were careful 
to ensure their perspectives were publicised and understood in the hope of having these 
reflected in the electoral agenda.  In 2010, much more than in previous elections, the third 
sector was an issue up for discussion, with multiple policy implications. Policy actors 
interviewed were extremely keyed up to the opportunities of the 2010 election, which 
provided an important reference point in their strategic planning. Consequently, within the 
third sector, election campaigning was effectively taking place well in advance of the  general  
election, and fairly intensively over the preceding six months.  However, reflecting the 
sector’s diversity, distinctions emerged in terms of TSOs’ campaigning portfolios, which 
ranged from an extended timeline of political campaigning; campaigning focused on the 
official election period, to opportunistic campaigning, and even anti-electoral campaigning.   
 
For the TSOs who organised their campaigning over a more expended period, a common 
strategy was to campaign in the year running up to the election, and to redouble their efforts 
thereafter when it was regarded as critical to engage with a new government.  They aimed to 
get organisational interests represented in party manifestos, and thus campaigning concerns 
were targeted, succinct and achievable. 
 
if you are a, kind of, lobbying charity and you’re trying to get stuff in manifestos, 
you’ve got to be doing that, like, a year ago, you had to be starting that ages ago and 
doing the manifesto right at the eve of the election is too late.  
(infrastructure organisation) 
 
TSOs’ most explicitly campaign-focused strategy was the publication of manifestos in the 
months preceding the general election, thus ensuring they received maximum publicity.  
Sometimes with a charter or pledge attached for MPs to sign up to, this approach had 
advantages in terms of staking out organisations’ ground and providing clarity on desired 
action from political parties. 
 
In 2010, a major difference in election planning that differentiated TSOs’ work from their 
more routine campaigning was that the uncertain electoral outcome necessitated their 
conscious engagement with a range of political parties.  For many organisations, these kinds 
of relationships had not existed with opposition parties prior to this election.  Consequently 
there was a need to start building dialogue and understanding some time in advance:   
 
for the last decade, with limited resources, the best way for us to influence government  
policy on behalf of our members, has been very much to focus on the ruling party and 
the executive.  And there’s not been much, you know, realistically, not been much point  
engaging with the others. (infrastructure organisation) 
 
This involved developing quotable relationships with third sector spokespeople in the three 
main parties, as well as identifying key policy makers and ideologues.  Specifically, there was 
a need to create effective channels for feeding information about third sector manifesto 6 
 
requests into the political parties’ planning processes, so that these could be reflected in the 
writing of party manifestos.   
 
The extent to which different methods of engagement were drawn upon was related to  
TSOs’ roles and intended closeness to government.  For example, some organisations saw 
themselves working in partnership with government on particular issues: ‘a few organisations 
have an awful lot of influence in terms of being able to walk in and out of government 
departments’, (infrastructure organisation).  Others regarded themselves as catalysts and 
prioritised maintaining a critical distance from political representatives: ‘we are the people 
who say the things that other people don’t say’ (community organisation).  Most of the TSOs 
we spoke to operated somewhere between these two positions. Realistically, good quality 
personal contacts between CEOs, civil servants and public officials were often the most 
effective method for the sector to influence policy.  However, the ad hoc nature of this kind of 
interaction made it difficult to identify or factor into organisational planning. 
 
In the six months’ preceding the election, key players in the third sector organised a number 
of summits, conferences and meetings, to build capacity and ensure that their policy 
aspirations fed into the political parties’ planning processes.  These included breakfast 
seminars, parliamentary receptions, and, notably, ACEVO’s summits with the three main 
parties – which, at the parties’ own preference, were markedly different in format. 
 
The February-April period was characterised by a flurry of activity from the sector publishing 
their manifestos in advance of the election.  Third Sector Online described this phenomenon 
as “manifesto mad,” “in vogue” and “a key weapon in the run-up to election day” (Donovan, 
2010).  Manifestos were often the product of months’ of consultation with memberships, as 
well as in communication with political parties.  From the interviews it was clear that this 
planning and interaction stage started back in late 2009.  Indeed, the impact of sector 
manifestos was arguably at its most powerful prior to publication and this was when the most 
critical consultation was going on with the next generation of policy makers.  By the time 
they were released into the public sphere it was too late influence party policy and political 
manifestos: “the big ideas have been fed in before then” (political representative), and their 
publication dates were often quite artificial.  By the time of the election campaign the third 
sector’s manifestos stood as position papers rather than catalysts for discussion. 
 
Following Gordon Brown’s announcement of the general election, government machinery 
went into purdah, transforming the relationship between civil service, political parties and the 
sector.  Guidance issued by the Parliament and Constitution Centre (Gay and White, 2010) to 
MPs explained the restrictions on civil servants’ activities, including deferred announcements 
on policy and a lack of involvement in any campaigns which may be deemed party political.  
In the research, stakeholders strongly emerged as sensitive not to engage in activities that 
might be construed as overstepping political boundaries, possibly more so than in previous 
elections because of its unpredictable outcome. 
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The political parties’ manifestos 
The three main parties’ manifestos contained significant detail on the third sector in 2010, 
although this was framed very differently.  Consequently these manifestos represent 
important historical resources marking this linguistic distinction and are ideologically telling.  
Interviewees often commented on the meaningfulness of these differences, and they were 
clearly important to political parties, yet this was not a debate which was being publically-
pursued.   Kendall (2009) has discussed the contested terrain of definitions and typologies for 
the sector, with a range of ‘collective nouns’ being favoured at different times and in different 
contexts.  There has been no one universally-agreed definition for the sector, which has 
instead been informed by policy actors and political players with differential power 
positioning. 
 
There was understandably greater pragmatism about their public use of terminologies among 
third sector informants than political actors.  However, in analysing the parties’ manifestos 
and considering how they framed the sector, there is an issue about the intended readership of 
these documents.  Perhaps reflecting the electorate’s distance from some of this terminology, 
manifestos tended not to talk about ‘the sector’ in its various formulations or to deal with 
relevant issues in a neat documentary section.  But there was significant divergence in how 
the parties presented sectoral issues in their manifestos, and their decision not to engage in a 
debate on sector definition is revealing in terms of these issues’ presentational difficulties.  
By contrast, the policy actors interviewed summarised the sectoral issues of the 2010 general 
election much more coherently and succinctly than the party manifestos. 
 
The Labour manifesto, A future fair for all, focused on rebuilding the economy, whilst 
reforming and protecting public services, ‘strengthening society’ and ‘renewing politics’.  
The third sector’s role was conceptualised in terms of greater involvement in the provision of 
public services, and crucially the manifesto valued the sector’s independence and 
campaigning role.  Key discourse were ‘fair’, ‘active reforming government’, ‘level playing 
field’ and ‘strengthening’.  Its approach to the sector was one of consolidation and was the 
most integrated of the three parties, which is perhaps unsurprising given that its author, Ed 
Miliband, was a former Minister for the Third Sector.  It related third sector issues to most 
aspects of policy in its chapters on living standards, education, crime and immigration, 
families and older people, communities, and global future.  Its greatest concentration on 
sectoral issues was in its Communities and Creative Britain chapter.  Reflecting the then 
government’s policy of using ‘third sector’ to promote inclusivity, it was the only party 
manifesto to employ that terminology, although more broadly it used a mixed discourse, 
talking about ‘third sector organisations’, ‘voluntary sector organisations’, ‘social enterprise’, 
‘civil life and pride’, ‘voluntary and community sector’, and ‘civil society’.  Notably, no use 
was made of the term ‘charity/charitable sector’. 
 
The Conservative Party’s manifesto, Invitation to join the government of Britain (2010a), was 
characterised by language of a ‘new kind of government’, ‘ Big Society’, ‘civic society’ and 
‘responsibility’, and while there were marked similarities with the Labour manifesto on third 8 
 
sector policy, Invitation was framed in a language of change.  It was dominated by the 
Conservative’s Big Society agenda, on which they had consulted with key TSOs, 
empowering individuals to change local communities.  Their Change Society chapter 
concentrated on sectoral issues, which were relayed in a distinctive language.  No reference 
was made to the third sector, but instead to ‘voluntary sector providers’, ‘Big Society’ 
(repeatedly contrasted to ‘broken society’ and ‘big government’), ‘civil society’, ‘civic 
society’, ‘civic responsibility’, ‘voluntary (and community) sector’, and ‘community 
organisers/ sector/participation’.  Outside of this focal chapter there were few references to 
sectoral issues, an approach which may be telling in light of the Party’s later presentational 
issues relating the Big Society concept to the electorate.  Crucially, the manifesto also 
sketched out plans to eliminate the budget deficit over the course of a single parliament. 
 
The Liberal-Democrat manifesto, more literally titled The Liberal Democrat manifesto 2010 
(2010), was distinctive in making most sparse mention of third sector issues, whichever 
terminology was employed to locate them, aside from a proposed reform to simplify Gift Aid.  
What coverage it provided was contained within its your job, your family, and your 
community chapters (no capitalisation), and discussed in terms of ‘voluntary providers’, 
‘voluntary sector’ and ‘social enterprise’.  Notably, the manifesto made no reference to the 
terms ‘third sector’, ‘civil/civic sector’ or ‘community sector’.  More broadly, it drew upon 
discourse such as ‘hope’, ‘credibility’ and ‘fairness’ to set out its polity priorities. 
 
Clearly it is problematic to draw direct correlations between third sector campaigning and 
policy representation in party manifestos.  However, a particularly successful umbrella 
agency, in terms of getting its key requests reflected in political parties’ manifestos, had 
invested considerable early effort targeting the authors of the Labour, Conservative and 
Liberal-Democrat manifestos, prioritising this over higher-level work with Ministers:  
 
it felt appropriate to, you know, go directly to the people that were given the task of 
writing the manifestos and developing the party visions. 
 
Two interviewees representing infrastructure organisations noted the effectiveness of the 
social enterprise movement in taking its message to political parties and appropriating 
language, “borrowing from the private sector”, and making a significant investment in 
“lobbying and communications.”  The social enterprise movement subsequently found its 
interests well represented in party manifestos and taken up in politicians’ language. 
 
A consensus politics? 
On the basis of their manifesto formalisations all parties shared a positive interpretation of the 
sector’s role in society, which they were keen to develop: a broad-brush consensus.   Even the 
visible differences on the finer detail on third sector policy were described by one 
infrastructure organisation as ‘different versions of the same thing”.  However, this unusually 
high degree of agreement on the third sector’s importance placed in it in a delicate position.  
While it was valuable to have achieved recognition (for the Conservatives verging on 9 
 
centrepiece placement) in the manifestos, total accord risked its concerns simply not being 
debated and publicised.  At the same time, sectoral issues were low on the public radar, a fact 
reflected in their scant coverage in the mainstream press, and it was unrealistic to expect 
dramatic shifts in public attitudes to the sector over a single election campaign. 
 
 it wasn’t a matter of great discussion and great controversy, but there was a  
sense in which, you know, it didn’t need to be.  It is high on the parties’ agendas and, 
you know, there was no argument about that.  (specialist media commentator) 
 
However, as we have previously argued, this was at best a surface consensus (Alcock et al., 
2012), and differentiated ideological frameworks remained in place underpinning policy 
discourse.  Most fundamentally, these ideologies informed parties’ commitments to the 
sector, positions connected to how they viewed its fundamental purpose.  A political 
representative described a key difference between the Conservative and Labour Parties: the 
Conservatives wanted to make greater use of the sector, but at the expense of the more 
supported and partnership-orientated basis of the Labour Party.  She summarised this 
distinction in terms of ‘partnership and not replacement’.  Such differences in emphasis, far 
from embodying a consensus politics, potentially translate into huge differences in approach 
to and relationships with the sector, the effects of which are only now playing out.  The 
linguistic differences uncovered by a more detailed reading of the parties’ manifestos provide 
further corroboration of such distinctions, revealing significant political nuances in the 
meaning and value attached to the sector. 
 
The 2010 campaign 
The 2010 general election campaign took place on multiple stages, with the televised 
leadership debates and Internet coverage providing new and significantly expanded media 
outputs.  As with all electoral campaigns, it was only partly in politicians’ power to map out 
its agenda.  Although the party manifestos represented a line in the sand, their relative lack of 
controversy in 2010 meant that it was left to the press and third sector to draw out points of 
political distinction, which inevitably focused on differences of style and personality.  The 
political science literature suggests that a degree of rationality in this as a political strategy.  
Bartels (2012) analysed OECD countries’ election results during recession, and argued that at 
such times the electorate was less concerned with ideology and made pragmatic decisions 
about parties’ economic management potential. That the electorate were confused about 
policy differences between the parties (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2011) suggests that politicians 
were relatively successful in this risk-averse strategy, but campaigns were subsequently 
criticised for their lack of clear direction. 
 
There was perceived to be a uniqueness about the election, whose anticipated open-
endedness, combined with the looming spectre of the need to address the deficit, stifled 
radical debate and made it difficult to analyse third sector issues in isolation from their 
broader political context.  Additionally, the degree of party consensus on the third sector 
effectively ensured that it was not debated, and that sectoral issues which made it onto the 10 
 
agenda only picked up on differing emphases. One interviewee suggested that clarity and 
debate on issues actually dissipated during election time, overtaken by an electoral narrative 
relatively unrelated to the interests at stake: 
 
I think now we’re in the stage of election, it’s hard to get a reality grip, so it feels like  
there’s a bit of a fog and there’s lots of rhetoric and interest in wanting to agree, but it  
feels quite phoney in a way, just the expedient of elections, kind of, crowds out 
everything else. (infrastructure agency) 
 
In an important sense party manifestos reflected the third sector’s success in getting their 
interests onto the agenda. Consequently there was little expectation or accompanying 
campaigning at this point for sectoral interests to achieve a broader spotlight.  Besides, having 
won political approval it was not in the sector’s interests to jeopardise their position by 
inviting potential controversy.  The general election campaign as played out in the media and 
public consciousness did not, by and large, touch explicitly on the sector’s role, although it 
was often implicitly at the heart of parties’ agendas.  Peripheral discussion on third sector 
issues such as volunteering and Gift Aid were not the stories that captured the election’s 
mainstream narrative.  
 
One notable exception to this third sector policy silence, and one put in an explicitly populist 
language, was the Conservative’s Big Society policy agenda (Blond, 2010), which stood as 
the centrepiece to its manifesto and kick-started its election campaign.  Ostensibly about 
citizen engagement and localised service provision, Tam has argued (2012) the Big Society 
was in fact the frontend of a ‘small state agenda’ and shrinking of public services: policy with 
explicitly Thatcherite roots.  During the campaign, however, it fell out of favour, and 
following anonymous Conservative activists’ complaints about their difficulties explaining 
the Big Society to the electorate, Cameron stepped back from using the platform of the 
leadership debates to raise the policy’s profile and enhance clarity.  During the final half of 
the campaign there was barely a mention of this fundamental aspect of their manifesto. 
 
Several interviewees welcomed a debate about the Big Society, anticipating that it would 
trigger deeper discussions about the sector’s future role.  Realistically, as one infrastructure 
organisation put it, a prevalent feeling in the sector was that “that’s the next debate to be 
had”, on the basis that the necessity of addressing the deficit meant that whoever formed the 
next government would need to reassess the role of the State.  The same interviewee 
suggested Labour would be likely to frame this in terms of ‘co-production’. 
 
The knowledge that the election winners would be charged with difficult spending decisions 
tempered the development of financial commitments and coloured every debate.  It also 
opened up new possibilities for the sector in terms of public sector reform, an area high on the 
Conservative’s agenda.   However, while the economy and possibility of a double-dip 
recession were of central concern, all parties avoided  getting into  detailed and potentially 
electorally unpopular discussions about proposed deficit management - decisions which the 11 
 
Institute of Fiscal Studies (2010) stressed were inevitable for whoever formed the next 
government.  Consequently, the third sector’s potential role in public sector reform was only 
discussed in the vaguest of senses.  One infrastructure organisation reflected that this 
approach was inevitable during an election: 
 
I think it’s good that that’s on the agenda, because at least whoever wins the election,  
there will be some reflection on what that might mean and I think it’s opened up the  
debate about the different roles the sector might play in a reshaped state. 
 
These debates have an ongoing narrative, and whether they are played out during election 
time is broadly irrelevant, particularly in the case of the deficit debate which was unavoidable 
over the longer-term.  As is typical for elections, following the initial structuring influence of 
the party manifestos, the campaign took on its own momentum.  A political representative 
commented: 
 
I think it’s rather a shame that so much else got squashed during that time, it was an  
unusual election campaign to be a candidate on.  On the doorstep, one of the big issues  
were the leaders’ debates.  And the economy.  And I think, alongside that, lots of other  
issues got pushed to one side. 
 
The televisised leadership debates, a new element in British electoral politics (Pattie and 
Johnston, 2011), provided a weekly focus for the contest.  However, third sector content was 
more or less absent from these, and Cameron had already stropped name-checking the Big 
Society by the first debate on home affairs, where it most naturally might have sat. 
 
A substantive surprise addition to the 2010 electoral debate was the community agenda and 
the Citizens UK ‘fourth debate’, which had a late influence on discussion.  This was 
unexpected in that nationally Citizens UK were not regarded as part of the mainstream third 
sector, and indeed were stylistically quite unusual (not least in their strategy to campaign 
during the election period).  Influenced by the methods of the Chicagoan political activist 
Saul Alinsky (Horwitt, 1992) they sought to express the collective agenda of locally-rooted 
groups such as churches, mosques and trade unions. Their work has been especially focused 
on building community power and training organisations to become politically confident.  
Their success in doing so is reflected in their ability to regularly sustain the critical mass of 
events like the 4
th May assembly, when an estimated 2,500 were in attendance.   
 
A number of factors came together during the last week of the campaign to focus interest on 
the Citizens UK event.  Staged just days before polling day, it was covered by a number of 
key media commentators.  The Citizens UK debate was interesting in that it appears to have 
at least partly driven the community organising agenda onto the mainstream.   Community 
engagement represented a dimension of sectoral debate which had been little anticipated and 
whose complexity makes it difficult to push forward within a traditional policy framework.  




At election time, third sector press coverage was far from assured, and only the most ‘eye-
catching’ campaigns had a chance of achieving national recognition. In a point reiterated by 
several interviewees, under normal circumstances one or occasionally two broadsheet 
newspapers could be relied upon to provide some sectoral analysis, but during elections these 
expectations were suspended as papers became ‘reactive’, chased the most topical stories, and 
third sector issues were ‘squeezed out’: 
 
I mean obviously ones are more sympathetic, like The Guardian and The Times and so  
on.  The Guardian in particular, obviously, are much more sympathetic and much more  
likely to go into the detail.  But clearly all media, whether it be third sector or national, 
will tend to focus on what’s news, what’s unusual, what’s controversial, so that’s 
always a natural bias really.  (infrastructure organisation) 
 
Where third sector issues got picked up, they tended to involve specific and containable 
policy platforms, such as Gift Aid or the Lottery, and there was a reportage gap in terms of 
more complex issues.  Consequently, a whole range of policy matters never made the agenda. 
 
Another infrastructure organisation complained that when the media sought out commentary 
from the sector it consulted the most high-profile umbrella agencies, which reproduced a 
particular viewpoint.  A media commentator also noted that particular third sector 
organisations developed a reputation for being more or less ‘outspoken’ or ‘guarded’, and this 
affected the way that some journalists worked.  
 
As noted earlier, elections provide somewhat artificial political discussions, in part because of 
the expectation that debates have neatly containable narratives and conclusions.  During the 
2010 general election, politicians’ concern was to be seen as listening to all interests, while 
simultaneously the leadership debates pitched parties against one another and made consensus 
(“I agree with Nick”) a matter of incredulity.  Indeed the cult of personality engendered in the 
leadership debates dominated media coverage post-broadcast.  Election time presents a 
theatre of relationships that bears little relation to their typical style. 
 
Rebranding the sector: 
A key distinction between political parties was in terms of the questions raised by the 
Conservatives in their 2008 Green Paper about the concept of the third sector and their 
proposal to retitle the government office the Office for Civil Society (Conservative Party, 
2008).  This politically charged intention was actioned just a week after the Coalition 
Government took office.  Reaction to the conscious change in terminology amongst 
interviewees was mixed, albeit generally cautious: 
 
There’s a whole different lexicon compared to the last government that everybody’s  13 
 
learning so it’s still in that, kind of, getting to grips with what’s happening to it I 
suppose.  (support organisation) 
 
The point was made several times that Nick Hurd, the new Minister for the sector, had been 
building up to a rebrand while in opposition and had repeatedly made the point that ‘third 
sector’ implied a prioritising that reflected badly on the sector.  Hurd was quoted as saying 
that the term ‘third sector’ had been banned across the Coalition government because “the 
boss really doesn’t like it” (Mason, 2010). One positive effect of the rebrand was felt to be 
that sectoral issues could become more accessible: 
 
you talk to a normal person in the street and they go “What?  What’s third sector?”  I  
mean, people know what charities are, they know what, you know, a community group 
is.  (support organisation) 
 
This interviewee countered, however, that ‘civil society’ provided no greater transparency 
than ‘third sector’, a reading which suggests an ideological motive behind the terminological 
change.  Indeed, as Alcock pointed out, the debate does not compare like with like, since 
‘civil society’ is a theoretical concept, “focusing on how we conceive of relations rather than 
how we classify organisations” (Alcock, 2010b: 388), while ‘third sector’ has provided a 
unifying framework – “a strategic unity” – for a diverse body of organisations and interests, 
around which policy has been mobilised (Alcock, 2010a).  More unequivocally, “civil society 
is not just a synonym for third sector” (Alcock 2010b: 386). Similarly, Wagner (2012) warns 
against using the terms ‘third ‘sector’ and ‘civil society’ interchangeably, representing 
distinctive, albeit potentially enhancing, paradigms.  The support organisation above 
described a disconnect between the language of the policy world and their customers, a 
viewpoint interesting in the light of the term ‘policy wonk’ creeping into mainstream 
discourse in 2010 to disparage politicians’ distance from the electorate. 
 
While some interviewees dismissed the Coalition Government’s rebranding mission, 
regarding it as “a bit of a joke”, “tiresome” and “superficial”, others were more hostile and 
took it as evidence of a shift in the state-sector relationship’s balance of power: 
 
I think it’s entirely inappropriate and disrespectful.  I don’t see the private sector 
having a makeover or, you know, the State being called something other than the State, 
so why should our sector be renamed by somebody else?  I think that’s a classic, kind 
of, imposition of hegemony really.  (infrastructure organisation) 
 
For this organisation, the term ‘third sector’ was an unsatisfactory one within which to locate 
themselves, and there was a similar sense of malcontent with the term amongst several of 
those interviewed, at the same time as they pragmatically accepted its heuristic value.  
Perhaps one of the most frustrating aspects for the sector of its naming and renaming was that 
these political decisions were removed from it, and TSOs never had an opportunity to engage 
in discussions.  Who was included and prioritised in the definition of the sector was also 14 
 
unsettling – community groups were more easily encompassed in a discourse of ‘civil 
society’ than were infrastructure organisations.  However, even when terminology was 
apparently uncontested, it was employed variably.  For example, a civil servant commented 
that those on different sides of the political spectrum applied the name ‘social enterprise’ to 
very divergent kinds of organisations.  
 
Conclusions: 
Having achieved mainstream credibility over the past ten years, the third sector approached 
the 2010 general election as an opportunity to raise its profile and push forward its agenda, a 
balancing act in the context of the election’s uncertain outcome.  It achieved these aims in a 
cooperative style, enjoying productive relationships with political parties, and enacting long-
term campaigning strategies to ensure that its interests were well understood and represented.  
An apparently broad political consensus on the sector gave it confidence in assuming this 
role, validated by the publication of the parties’ manifestos and their recognition of the sector. 
 
The general election/purdah period was a more complicated and unpredictable campaigning 
time, when the sector tended to concentrate upon a consolidation and commentary role.  
Although third sector interests were fundamental to the main political parties’ policy 
programmes, these debates did not translate well into an electoral narrative for the media or 
general public.  TSOs developed a range of soft and more measurable indicators during this 
period to evaluate their campaigning.  These included achieving coverage in the trade and 
mainstream press, gaining named support for specific pledges, building good working 
relationships with key political figures, and getting their points represented in party 
manifestos.  Informants frequently made the point that the sector had enjoyed  a good early 
campaign; that is, that third sector organisations’ pre-election campaigning had been 
consolidated, entering the electoral period with their interests well-represented and 
understood, but that it was not realistic for this profile to be maintained during the unusual 
circumstances of election time.  Indeed there was a relative lack of concrete debate during the 
election and third sector issues mostly remained a subtext. The 2010 general election was not 
won or lost on the third sector, and although the sector enjoyed a defining election, issues like 
the economy and personality dominated the agenda and public interest.    
 
However, 2010 being a ‘landmark election’ (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2011), whose conclusion 
was uniquely open and which saw a post-war low in Labour and Conservative voting (Fisher 
and Wlezien, 2011), prompted some uncharacteristic political manoeuvring among both 
parties and stakeholders to hedge this uncertainty, and saw the third sector engage with the 
election as a political player.  The third sector sought to maximise political capital by 
maintaining the ‘strategic unity’ which had served them so well under a Labour 
administration, and political parties exhibited a ‘surface consensus’ on third sector issues 
which concealed ideological differences potentially more controversial with an unpredictable 
electorate.  In this sense, strategic unity was now being deployed as an electoral strategy by 
the sector to shore up political consensus.  It seems unlikely that we will ever see party-sector 
interests so neatly aligned again, it being a temporary and mutually beneficial phenomenon 15 
 
associated with very specific circumstances.  The real issue on which the election would be 
decided – the deficit – was an unspoken narrative; consensus politics was the necessary 
compromise to fudge the issue.  Possibly in more prosperous economic times a more opaque 
discussion would have emerged about third sector issues. 
 
If a general election can be considered to have sectoral winners and losers, then social 
enterprise, the community sector, and organisations allied or influential to the new Coalition 
government, such as the Big Society Network and the think tank ResPublica, emerged in a 
positive light.  By contrast, early policy developments made infrastructure organisations 
nervous about their future, and spending cuts looked set to hit larger, more contract dependant 
organisations hardest.   
 
One of the key features of the 2010 election was the difference discourses deployed by the 
political parties around sectoral issues, the Labour Party’s ‘third sector’ contrasting with the 
Conservative’s ‘civil society’ and the Liberal Democrat’s ‘voluntary sector’.  This reflected 
different priorities and interpretations of the sector’s role, and a challenge for both sector and 
commentators has been to decode this language to navigate an uncertain future.  In order to 
understand the story of third sector electoral politics in 2010, it is insufficient to examine the 
policies and relationships between political parties and sector; the politically-loaded discourse 
that has coloured virtually every aspect of these interactions must also be scrutinised.  The 
third sector is now in the unprecedented position of having had a good campaign, but having 
to renegotiate a new set of alignments under a Coalition government.  Their adaptability and 
skills in forging working alliances to build a new kind of engagement will be called upon now 
more than ever as they traverse this new and potentially leaner political territory.   
 
Post-election and mid-deficit reduction, the sector clearly has a functional role in the 
Coalition government’s programme.  Despite an apparent desire to consult on working with 
the sector (OCS, 2011), early analysis of the state/sector relationship under the Coalition 
government has counselled for caution in the context of economic retrenchment and a 
different set of attitudes about third sector functions (Macmillan, 2011). So far these have 
signalled greater emphasis upon ‘entrepreneurialism’ and a shift away from partnership 
working, couched in the Coalition’s localist agenda and spearheaded by its Big Society 
rhetoric.  The broad political consensus that emerged in the party manifestos regarding the 
sector has been rather differently operationalised since the general election, with the 
Conservative Party’s third sector policy’s distinctive ideological roots becoming increasingly 
evident.   
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